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analyze the effects of the doctrine of impracticability
on “relational” contracts -- long-term contractual
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circumstances and unforeseen contingencies as they arise.
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ethics of relational agreements, and that it clashes with
principles of moral desert.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The

doctrine

of

impracticability

provides

an

affirmative

defense to a complaint seeking specific performance or damages for
an alleged breach of contract.

It may be interpreted as a default

rule that provides an implied term in every contract excusing the
parties from their obligations in the event that some unforeseen
contingency causes their performances to become "impracticable."
Although its precise meaning is unclear, the term "impracticable"
connotes severe -- perhaps even catastrophic -- consequences.

In

this respect, the doctrine is tantamount to an implied force
majeure clause that applies whenever the impracticability is the
result of circumstances that were in some sense unforeseen at the
time

the

contract

was

formed.

Although

the

criteria

for

establishing whether the circumstances were "unforeseen" are also
unclear,

they

subsume

at

the

very

least

the

idea

that

the

circumstances were not explicitly provided for under the contract.
The impracticability doctrine evolved relatively recently out
of the doctrines of impossibility and frustration of purpose.1
Indeed, until the middle of the nineteenth century the common law
almost
1

always

required

specific

performance

of

contractual

For an overview of the evolution of the legal doctrine, see articles by Paul

L. Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, The Uranium Market And The Westinghouse Case, 6
J. Leg. Stud. 119 (1977), and Richard Posner & Andrew Rosenfield, Impossibility and

Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. Leg. Stud. 83 (1977).

2

obligations.

The doctrine the courts most commonly applied was the

"rule of absolute liability."

Taylor

v.

Caldwell,2

which

This rule was relaxed, however, in
excused

both

parties

from

their

performances when the music hall one had contracted to rent from
the other was destroyed by a fire, thus establishing the doctrine
of impossibility.

The doctrine of frustration was established in

Krell v. Henry,3 a case in which a party was excused from paying
for a room it had contracted to rent to view King Edward VII's
coronation when the coronation parade was cancelled due to the
King's illness.

This case, and others collectively referred to as

the "Coronation Cases,"4 expanded the range of circumstances under
which the common law would excuse performances beyond those which
made them physically impossible.
Although all of these cases were English, both doctrines were
subsequently adopted by American courts.

Indeed, modern statements

of both doctrines have been written into the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts.5

A number of American cases have, however, further

2

Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B. & S. 826, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (1863).

3

Krell v. Henry, [1903] 2 K.B. 740.

4

See Andrew Kull, Mistake, Frustration, and the Windfall Principle of Contract

Remedies, 43 Hastings Law J. 1, 22-23 (1991).
5

See Restatement (Second) of Contracts, sections 263 and 265.
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expanded

the

range

of

circumstances

performances may be excused.

in

which

contractual

In Mineral Park,6 for instance, the

defendants were excused on the grounds that their performances were
"impracticable."

Mineral Park and similar cases thus established

the doctrine of impracticability.
devotes

more

attention

to

this

The Restatement (Second) now
doctrine

than

to

either

impossibility or frustration of purpose, and the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.) has made it the principal excuse doctrine for sales
contracts.

The trend in the black letter law, at least, has

clearly been in the direction of expanding the grounds on which
excuse will be granted.
It is not at all clear, however, that this has been the trend
in the case law.
followed.

Cases such as Mineral Park have not been widely

Indeed, the courts' apparent reluctance to grant excuse

despite the clear indications in both the Restatement (Second) and
the U.C.C. that they may do so remains a conundrum.

As a number of

scholars have noted,7 the inconsistencies in the case law merely
reflect the confusion and disagreement among the courts about the
appropriate role to assign to the excuse doctrines.

Nonetheless,

6

Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458 (1916).

7

See Posner & Rosenfield, supra; Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in

Long-Term Contracts, 75 Cal. Law Rev. 2005 (1987); Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial
Rationality and the Duty to Adjust Long-Term Contracts, 69 Minn. Law Rev. 521 (1985).
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the courts have generally resolved any ambiguities inherent in the
doctrines by construing them narrowly against the parties that have
attempted to use them.8
The inconsistencies in the case law have been reflected in the
commentary of legal scholars.

Whereas an early study of excuse

doctrines by Posner and Rosenfield purported to show that "...the
common law has an internal economic logic stronger than many legal
scholars believe...,"9 some more recent studies have questioned
whether they may have any useful role at all.10
put

it,

"The

continued

existence

of

As George Triantis
the

doctrine

[of

impracticability], even if substantially dormant, only serves to
preserve the confusion and uncertainty as to its application and
scope.

The

role

of

contract

law

should

be

limited

to

the

interpretation and enforcement of the parties' risk allocations."11
The conclusions of scholarly studies are, of course, always

8

Gillette, supra note 7, at 523.

9

Posner and Rosenfield, supra note 1, at 118.

10

See, for instance, Gillette, supra note 7; Scott, supra note 7; Alan O. Sykes,

The Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability in a Second-Best World, J. Leg. Stud. 43
(1990); George G. Triantis, Contractual Allocations Of Unknown Risks: A Critique Of

The Doctrine Of Commercial Impracticability, 42 Univ. of Tor. Law J. 450 (1992).
11

Triantis, supra note 10, at 483.
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contingent on their own particular theoretical perspectives and
assumptions.

Some studies of the excuse doctrines, for instance,

have principally investigated how they might affect the efficiency
of contractual risk allocations.12

These have tended to conclude

that excuse doctrines should have a very limited role.

A number of

more recent studies, on the other hand, have attempted to assess
whether the excuse doctrines may serve a more useful role in the
context of relational contracts.

In these contexts the parties may

have a duty to adjust their agreements as they unfold.13
many

scholars

now

recognize

that

the

field

of

Indeed,

relational

contracting is itself of sufficient importance to merit much
further study.14
This essay offers a further analysis of excuse doctrines in a
relational contracting context.
impracticability,

in

part

It focuses on the doctrine of

because

this

has

been

the

most

controversial of the excuse doctrines, and in part because the
technical distinctions between the various excuse doctrines are of
12

This is clearly a strong focus of some of the studies already cited, such as

Posner and Rosenfield, supra note 1, and Triantis, supra note 10.
13

See, for instance, Gillette, supra note 7; Scott, supra note 7.

14

For recent studies that promote the importance of relational contracting, see

Scott, supra note 7; Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts In The Courts: An Analysis Of

Incomplete Agreements And Judicial Strategies, 21 J. Leg. Stud. 271 (1992).
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relatively little practical importance for analytical purposes.15
To establish the groundwork for the analysis, the essay provides a
behavioral

economics

framework

within

which

both

relational

contracting practices and the doctrine of impracticability may be
given

concrete

analytic

form.

The

framework

joins

the

new

institutional approach to economics, particularly as it has been
developed by Oliver Williamson,16 with the game-theoretic approach
to relational contracting suggested by Scott.17
This essay thus lies at the confluence of two related streams
of scholarly research.
hardly surprising.
response

to

analysis.18
in

the

15

16

The concept of a relational contract emerged in
real-world

limitations

of

classical

contract

And the new institutional approach to economics emerged

response

economics.

The confluence of these two streams is

to

the

real-world

limitations

of

neoclassical

It is no mere coincidence that classical contract

See Posner and Rosenfield, supra note 1, at 84-86.

Oliver

E.

Williamson,

Transaction-Cost

Economics:

The

Governance

of

Contractual Relations, 22 J. Law & Econ. 233 (1979); see also Oliver E. Williamson,
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, (1985).
17

Scott, supra note 7.

18

See Goetz and Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 Virginia Law Rev.

1089, 1089-1091 (1981).
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analysis and neoclassical economics both conceive of transactions
as complete contingent claims contracts.19

Nor is it surprising

that the study of relational contracts and new institutional
economics have common origins in empirical observations of realworld business behavior.20

What is surprising, however, is that,

given their cognate origins and common concerns, the connections
between the two have not been given more attention.

Relational Contracting
A relational contract21 may be defined as an agreement of an
ongoing nature between two or more parties which is typically

19

Goetz and Scott, supra note 18; Williamson, supra note 16.

20

In particular, Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A

Preliminary Study, 28 Am. Sociological Rev. 55 (1963).
21

Until very recently, the term "relational contract" was used primarily by

legal scholars.

Economists usually referred to such agreements more generally using

the terms "long-term contract" or "incomplete contract."

This no doubt reflected a

difference in the focus of most of the economic scholarship, which tended to emphasize
the initial contracting stage of an agreement and its incentive effects rather than
any subsequent adaptations.

The focus of the economics literature has recently begun

to emphasize the subsequent adaptations, however, and economists are increasingly
using the term “relational contract”.
Institutions

and

Economic

Theory,

See Eirik G. Furubotn and Rudolph Richter,

(1997),

and

Robert

Gibbons,

Incentives

in

Organizations, 12 J. Econ. Persp. 115 (1998) for surveys of the economics literature.
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adapted to changing circumstances and unique situations as they
arise.

In contrast to the complete contingent claims contracts of

classical

contract

analysis

and

neoclassical

economics,

a

relational contract is incomplete because "...the parties are
incapable of reducing important terms of the arrangement to welldefined obligations."22

Although the parties usually sign a formal

written instrument, they do so with the understanding that the
terms of the agreement will be adapted as the transaction unfolds.
The written instrument itself provides only a framework within with
such adaptations may occur.

Indeed, MacNeil suggests that the

written instrument may be thought of as more like a constitution
for the administration of the agreement than a contract in the
classical sense of the term.23
A relational contract is therefore neither as clearly and
completely defined or as formal and impersonal as the complete
contingent claims contracts of neoclassical economics and classical
contract theory.

Indeed, if all the possible means of facilitating

a transaction were arrayed along a continuum identifying the degree

22

Goetz and Scott, supra note 18, at 1091.

23

Ian R. MacNeil, Contracts: Adjustment Of Long-Term Economic Relations Under

Classical, Neoclassical, And Relational Contract Law 72 Northwestern Univ. Law Rev.
854, 894 (1978).

MacNeil does, however, also suggest that there are dangers in

pushing this metaphor too far.

9

to which the transaction is internalized within some administrative
hierarchy, with a classical contract at one end of the continuum
and the complete bureaucratic internalization of the transaction at
the

other,

middle.24

a

relational

contract

would

lie

somewhere

in

the

Relational contracts thus help to sustain "hybrid" modes

of economic organization -- those that lie somewhere in between
arms-length market transactions and transactions conducted under
the command and routine of formal organizations.25

In fact, they

may be characterized to some degree in terms of the fiduciary
responsibilities more commonly associated with a partnership than a
contract in the usual sense.26
In addition to being an important legal device, therefore,
relational contracts are also an important economic phenomenon.
Economists have long recognized the importance and vast scope of
the

economic

activities

that

are

coordinated

inside

formal

hierarchies rather than through market transactions, but they have
only relatively recently begun to acknowledge the importance of the
many economic activities that are coordinated through hybrid modes
of organization, such as those that involve relational contracts.
24

This visualization was first suggested by Williamson, although he applied it

to somewhat different concepts.

See Williamson, supra note 16.

25

Id.

26

Gillette, supra note 7, at 571.
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The new institutional economics, particularly as it has been
developed by Williamson, has clearly been at the forefront of
emerging new lines of research on nonmarket modes of economic
organization.
The new institutional economics traces its origins to Ronald
Coase's famous paper on the theory of the firm.27

This was the

first significant attempt by an economist to explain the role of
the business firm in an otherwise market-oriented, capitalist
economy.

The paper conceived of modes of economic organization,

however,

in

terms

of

a

simple

dichotomy

--

all

modes

of

organization could be categorized as either "market" or "firm."
Since that paper, the lines have come to seem not only less clear,
but even somewhat arbitrary.

Research by noneconomists, including

legal scholars developing the field of relational contract law, has
been particularly influential.
Early theoretical work on relational contracting was also
strongly influenced by important empirical research in sociology,

27

Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937).

"other" paper for which Coase is rightly famous.

This is the

Although it has had less impact on

legal scholarship than the paper in which Coase presented his famous theorem, it has
been very influential on the economics literature.

See the symposium, Conference

Papers to Celebrate the Fiftieth Anniversary of the "Nature of the Firm" 4 J. Law,
Econ. & Org. 1 (1988) for a broad survey of its impact.
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particularly studies by Stewart Macaulay.28

Macaulay’s systematic

surveys of real-world business behavior revealed that many market
transactions were much less formal and much more fluid than either
economic theory or the theory of contracts seemed to acknowledge.
Subsequently, legal scholars began devising new avenues for legal
theory which recognized important distinctions between different
types of market transactions.29

And economists working in the

Coasian tradition30 -- particularly Williamson -- began to develop
new approaches to economics which could account for the rich
diversity of nonmarket as well as market institutions.
The interdisciplinary character of so much of the research has
28

29

Macaulay, supra note 20.

Notable early articles include Ian MacNeil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S.

Cal. Law Rev. 691 (1974(; MacNeil, supra note 23; Goetz and Scott, supra note 7.

30

One could debate who should be included in this group, but most economists

would probably agree that it should include transaction cost theorists such as Oliver
Williamson, Michael Wachter & John Harris, Understanding the Employment Relation: The

Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange, 6 Bell J. of Econ. 250 (1975), Victor Goldberg,
Toward an Expanded Economic Theory of Contract, 10 J. Econ. Issues 45 (1976), Benjamin
Klein, Michael Crawford, and Armen Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents,

and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. Law & Econ. 297 (1978), and Williamson,
supra note 16, as well as agency theorists such as Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership

Structure,

3

J.

Fin.

Econ.

305

(1976),and

Bengt

Holmstrom,

Moral Hazard and

Observability, 10 Bell J. of Econ. 74 (1979).
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made it an especially interesting -- and remarkably fertile -- area
of scholarship.

Most of the law and economics literature is

interdisciplinary only in the sense that it applies concepts and
techniques from economics to the analysis of the law and legal
institutions.31

The economics profession has generally treated the

law only as a source of problems to which its concepts and
techniques might be applied, and law and economics scholars within
the legal profession have usually been content to follow their
direction.
economic
looked

In their efforts to understand nonmarket modes of

organization,
to

the

law

however,

and

legal

some

economists

scholarship

have

for

actually

insight

and

inspiration, and not just applications for their techniques.32
Regardless of their disciplinary perspective, most scholars
would probably agree that both the practice and the theory of
relational contracting are still in their infancy.

There are still

many issues for scholars to explore, and relational contracting
practices themselves will probably continue to evolve.
31

It is thus

Indeed, the unofficial dean of the law and economics movement -- Judge Posner

-- has argued that this is the only appropriate direction of influence.
legal scholarship has little to offer to economic theory.

In his view,

See Richard A. Posner,

Overcoming Law, 440 (1995).
32

For an acknowledgement by Williamson of his use of the law and legal

scholarship, see Oliver E. Williamson, Revisiting Legal Realism: The Law, Economics,

and Organization Perspective 5 Ind. and Corp. Change 383 (1996).
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not yet clear whether relational contracting will require the
development of special legal doctrines.
traditional

legal

doctrines

in

the

Indeed, the role of

performance

contracts is still not well understood.33

of

relational

But since hybrid modes of

economic organization may be more important than many scholars have
previously acknowledged, and since they may grow in importance yet,
an understanding of this role is well worth pursuing.

Outline of the Essay
This essay attempts to construct an analytical framework
within which relational contracting practices may be understood,
and uses it to derive normative conclusions about the doctrine of
impracticability.

The broader contours of the framework are

provided by concepts from the literature on behavioral economics
and new institutional economics, and the details are filled in
using a simple game-theoretic conception of cooperation which
elaborates on the game-theoretic approach to relational contracting
suggested by Scott.34
In contrast to neoclassical economics, and most classical
contract analysis as well, both new institutional economics and the
legal scholarship on relational contracts commonly assume that
33

Scott, supra note 7, at 2012.

34

Id.
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economic agents' rationality is bounded -- that is, that there are
limits on agents' capacities to frame and solve economic problems.
Many

of

the

writers

who

have

addressed

the

doctrine

of

impracticability have also either explicitly or implicitly assumed
that agents' rationality is bounded.

Indeed, one might argue that

the doctrine of impracticability itself presumes that agents'
rationality is bounded.

It should come as no surprise, therefore,

that the bounded rationality assumption is also a central premise
of this essay.35

As this assumption is still controversial, section

II explains why it is necessary, and introduces some concepts and
terminology that will be helpful in formulating a theoretical
framework that is explicitly and self-consciously based on bounded
rationality assumptions.
Section III presents the theoretical framework and discusses
its implications.

Whereas many previous studies have concluded

that there is little, if any, useful role for the doctrine of
impracticability, the analysis here suggests that, if it can be

35

In this respect, the essay attempts to respond to the challenge issued by

other legal scholars to incorporate human frailties and cognitive limitations
explicitly into law and economics scholarship.

See Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing

Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and
Economics, 65 Chi-Kent. L. Rev. 23 (1989); Russell B. Korobkin and Thomas S.
Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law

and Economics, 88 Calif. L. Rev. 1051 (2000).
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wisely applied, the doctrine should help to reduce the costs of
governing relational contracts and provide a myriad of other
economic benefits.

One of the main implications of the theoretical

framework is that the parties to a relational contract may have to
incur significant governance costs in order to ensure that their
agreement will be sustainable.

These governance costs arise from

their need either to restrain their levels of cooperation and the
size of their investments or to invest in special arbitration
procedures in order to lessen the strategic uncertainties inherent
in their agreement.

If the doctrine of impracticability can be

wisely applied, it may help to reduce these strategic uncertainties
and thus increase the parties' levels of cooperation and the size
of

their

investments

without

the

use

of

costly

arbitration

procedures.
Section IV elaborates on these normative implications and
attempts

to

define

criteria

impracticability should be applied.

by

which

the

doctrine

of

The criteria that it suggests

are broadly consistent with at least some of the precedents.

They

are also consistent with the admonishments of those scholars who
have worried that expansive interpretations of the excuse doctrines
would dampen parties' incentives to allocate contractual risks
efficiently.

Section

V

addresses

whether

the

normative

prescriptions might conflict with any of the broader moral values
embedded in contract law, such as the principles of party autonomy

16

and

individual

self-expression,

and

assesses

whether

legal

intervention of the kind they support would undermine the moral and
ethical basis of any extralegal governance mechanisms that might
also be important to sustaining a relational contract.

Section VI

offers some conclusions.

II. BOUNDED RATIONALITY
The term "bounded rationality" refers to a conception of human
beings' cognitive abilities that recognizes limitations on the
human imagination and humans' information processing capacities.
It

implies

that

human

behavior

may

be

characterized

"intentionally rational, but only limitedly so."36
bounded

rationality

assumption

remains

as

Although the

controversial,

serious

controversy arises only from its use in economic models, not from
any disagreement about its descriptive relevance.
indisputable that human rationality is bounded.

It is simply

If it were not, no

one would ever experience true surprise, and a game of chess would
be no more challenging than a game of tic-tac-toe.

The important

issue is whether the bounded rationality assumption is necessary -or even helpful -- for constructing useful economic models and
conducting insightful analyses of legal doctrines.
36

This is a famous quote from Herbert Simon, who won the Nobel Prize in

economics in 1985 for his seminal work on bounded rationality.

See Herbert A. Simon,

Models of Man (1957).
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Those who believe it is not usually adhere to a logical
positivist philosophy of science, and often cite Milton Friedman's
famous paper37 on the methodology of positive economics in support
of their position.

Friedman's point in that paper was to emphasize

that a model need not be descriptively accurate to provide useful
predictions.

It

would

do

an

injustice

to

Friedman's

paper,

however, and to Friedman himself, to push that point too far.
Friedman’s argument does not imply that the assumptions of a model
are completely irrelevant, or that it is illegitimate to model
peoples' behavior as less than perfectly rational.

In fact, even

some of Friedman's critics acknowledge that he never intended to
embrace an inflexible logical positivist philosophy of science.38
Rather, his argument was a counter to critiques of neoclassical
economics which denied the relevance even of models which imputed
rather modest cognitive abilities to their agents.
Most of the models used by conventional economic theorists
today impute considerably more rationality to their agents than the
37

Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in Essays in Positive

Economics (1953).
38

McCloskey, for instance, notes that Friedman's essay was "more post-modernist

than one might suppose" and that "Friedman appeared to be struggling to escape the
grip of positivism and its intellectual traditions, though with only sporadic
success."

See D.N. McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Economics, 21 J. Econ. Lit. 481, 485-

486 (1983).
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relatively simple, static optimization models defended by Friedman.
Modern theorists commonly assume that economic agents are able to
solve infinite horizon inter-temporal optimization problems with
imperfect information using Bayesian priors and complex signaling
arrangements.
means.

Most noneconomists cannot even comprehend what that

There is a growing sentiment even within the economics

profession, however, that many of these models impute far too much
rationality to their agents, and that some conception of behavior
that is boundedly rational would yield significant advances in
economic theory.39
Indeed, a casual survey of the economics journals suggests
that there has never been any time in which the interest within the
economics

profession

in

models

based

on

bounded

assumptions has been greater than in the present.

rationality
And although

they might still believe that formal treatments are premature, a
number of leading economists have now attested to the desirability
of bounded rationality assumptions.40
39

Even Gary Becker, who has

See, for instance, the argument by John Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?, 34

J. Econ. Lit. 669 (1996).
40

For a good survey of recent work in economics that uses the bounded

rationality assumption, see Conlisk, supra note 39.

A list of the prominent

economists who have expressed an interest in or indicated a receptiveness to models
based on bounded rationality assumptions would have to include a number of Nobel prize
winners, including Herbert Simon, of course, and also Kenneth Arrow, James Buchanan,
Ronald Coase, Douglas North, and perhaps even Gary Becker.

These have been among the

19

pushed the perfect rationality assumption farther than almost
anyone else, has acknowledged in his Nobel lecture that "Actions
are constrained by income, time, imperfect memory and calculating

capacities, and other limited resources,"41 [italics added] and that
he may at times have imputed too much rationality to people in his
own work.42

Bounded Rationality and the Doctrine of Impracticability
Regardless of whether it has any widespread acceptance within
the economics profession, any serious treatment of the doctrine of
impracticability will require that bounded rationality be made
integral to the analysis.43

There are two prongs to the modern

doctrine of impracticability.

The first is the impracticability

test: in order for the doctrine to apply, performance of the
contract would have to result in a severe loss for the party
seeking

an

excuse.

The

second

is

the

foreseeability

test:

performance must have been made impracticable by an occurrence
most influential economists on the law and economics movement.
41

Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior, 101 J.

Pol. Econ. 385, 386 (1993).
42

43

Id. at 402.

This is a position that has been supported by a number of legal scholars,

including Joskow, supra note 1; Triantis, supra note 10; Gillette, supra note 7.
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which was unforeseen at the time of contracting.

Although it does

not appear to receive equal billing, the foreseeability test is by
no

means

less

important

than

impracticability.

As

Triantis

explains, "The doctrine necessarily rests on the premise that
contracting parties ... are unable to allocate contractually risks
that are unforeseen."44 [italics added]
Consider

the

language

of

U.C.C. section 2-615(a),

embodies the most contemporary version of the doctrine:
delivery

or

paragraphs

non-delivery

(b)

and

(c)

...
is

by

not

a

a

seller

breach

of

who
his

which

"Delay in

complies
duty

with

...

if

performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence

of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption
on which the contract was made..." [italics added].

Vague though

it may be, it is possible to interpret this language as alluding to
contingencies that are unforeseeable owing to the limits on the
rationality of the parties to the contract.

Indeed, such an

interpretation is supported by official comment 1, which explains
that "This section excuses a seller ... where his performance has
become commercially impracticable because of unforeseen supervening

circumstances not within the contemplation of the parties at the
time of contracting" [italics added].
In a world where everyone was unboundedly rational, it is

44

Triantis, supra note 10.
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difficult to imagine why any "unforeseen supervening circumstances"
that were not "within the contemplation of the parties at the time
of

contracting"

would

ever

arise,

particularly

if

they

were

potentially important enough to render the performance of the
contract impracticable.

One could, of course, argue that the high

costs of transacting might make it uneconomical for the parties to
address all contingencies in a detailed contract, but this does not
explain

why

the

circumstances

should

be

characterized

as

"unforeseen" and "not within the contemplation of the parties at
the time of contracting."

The explanation that is most compatible

with this essay, of course, is that both the courts and the
drafters of the U.C.C. have correctly perceived that the parties to
a contract are boundedly rational45 and that they will not always be
able to contemplate all of the contingencies that might arise
during the life of their agreement, even if those contingencies
might be important enough to render their performance of the
contract impracticable.
There are two very different ways in which bounds on agents'
rationality

could

explain

unforeseen

contingencies.

Since

boundedly rational agents are prone to make errors, unforeseen
contingencies could arise from the failure of the parties to
contemplate contingencies that should have been foreseeable based
45

That is not to say, of course, that they have ever thought about peoples’

cognitive limitations in exactly those terms.
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on past experience, expert advice, or common sense.

Although the

legal precedents are not crystal clear, it seems doubtful whether
unforeseen

contingencies

foreseeability test.

of

this

type

should

pass

the

If they did, the parties to a contract might

be excused from performances in situations which they could have
avoided altogether.
doctrine

of

As a number of scholars have noted,46 the

impracticability

would

hardly

provide

efficient

incentives if that was the way it was applied.
Unforeseen contingencies could also arise, however, even if
the parties drew wisely on their own and others' past experience,
the best expert advice, and were otherwise eminently sensible.

In

such a case, the contingencies would, in a sense, be reasonably
unforeseen.

Indeed, as Posner and Rosenfield have observed,47 some

courts have applied an objective version of the foreseeability test
and stated it in exactly those terms.

As one California court put

it,48
The purpose of a contract is to place the
risks of performance upon the promisor, and
the relation of the parties, terms of the
contract, and circumstances surrounding its
46

See Joskow, supra note 1, at 158 for a clear statement of the argument.

47

Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 1, at 99.

48

Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 54. 153 P.2d 47, 50 (1944).
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formation

must

be

examined

to

determine

whether it can be fairly inferred that the
risk

of

the

event

...

was

not

reasonably

foreseeable [italics added].
Under an objective version of the foreseeability test, the
parties would assume the risks of any contingencies that were
reasonably foreseeable.

This would appear to be more consistent

with the official interpretations of the U.C.C. than any subjective
version of the test.

As official comment 8 to U.C.C. section 2-615

indicates "... the exemptions of this section do not apply when the

contingency in question is sufficiently foreshadowed at the time of
contracting to be included among the business risks which are
fairly to be regarded as part of the dickered terms..." [italics
added].
provide

Thus
a

way

interpreted,
of

the

"delineating

foreseeability
the

boundary

doctrine

would

between

those

contingencies that are reasonably part of the decision-making
process and those that are not."49
The

modern

doctrine

of

impracticability,

therefore,

is

probably meant to be based on an objective foreseeability test.
There is, nonetheless, considerable disagreement in the legal
precedents, as well as in the commentary of legal scholars.50

The

49

Joskow, supra note 1, at 157.

50

Joskow, supra note 1, at 157-158, for instance, seems to think that the courts

would normally apply an objective test; Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 1, at 99-100,
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normative analysis below attempts to show that, if it is to provide
economically efficient incentives, the doctrine must involve the
application of an objective foreseeability test.

Indeed, the

analysis implies that there are governance costs associated with
any ambiguities or judicial errors in the application of the
doctrine.

This raises the issue of whether the courts can be

relied upon to apply the doctrine clearly and consistently enough
to reduce the costs of governing relational contracts overall, or
whether

their

efforts

will

simply

backfire

and

prove

counterproductive.
Indeed,

bounded

rationality

assumptions

should

not

only

characterize the parties to a relational contract, but also the
judges and juries that must interpret and apply any relevant legal
doctrines.51

If it is to be clearly and consistently applied, the

doctrine of impracticability must be within the scope of the
decision-making capabilities of the courts.

The issue is whether

criteria may be defined that are consistent with the purpose and
character of a relational contract, as well as the boundedly
rational behavior of the parties, and yet clear enough that they
on the other hand, seem to believe the foreseeability test is actually disappearing.
51

The general matter of judicial competence is beyond the scope of this essay.

See Gillian K. Hadfield, Judicial Competence And The Interpretation of Incomplete

Contracts, 23 J. Leg. Stud. 159 (1994) for an interesting survey of the relevant
literature.
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may be consistently applied by the courts given the existing rules
of evidence and the limited competencies of judges and juries.

Routines and Heuristics
The focus of this essay is on long-term contractual agreements
between relatively sophisticated business parties.
business firm is the basic unit of analysis.

Thus, the

Although it is not

necessarily inconsistent with bounded rationality assumptions, the
conceptualization

of

firm

behavior

in

neoclassical

economics

clearly highlights the sense in which it is rational at the expense
of comprehending how that rationality is bounded.
whether there is any practical alternative.

The issue is

While at one time

there may not have been, that is no longer true.

A diverse set of

scholars working within related but distinct fields of inquiry,
including

behavioral

economics,

the

organizational

economics,

management
theory,

of
have

decision

theory,

technology,
developed

and

evolutionary

managerial
an

and

alternative

conceptualization which characterizes firms’ behavior in terms of
their behavioral routines and decision-making heuristics.52
52

A number of legal scholars have already drawn on this conceptualization in

their own research, though perhaps without embracing the research agenda that
accompanies it.

See, for instance, Scott, supra note 7, Triantis, supra note 10.

For

an excellent overview of the literature and discussion of the basic approach, see
Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change
(1982).

For a discussion of the research agenda, see Michael D. Cohen et al.,
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There

is

considerably

more

flexibility

inherent

in

this

conceptualization of firm behavior than one might at first imagine.
As

Nelson

and

Winter

point

out,

a

firm's

behavior

may

be

represented by a hierarchy of routines and heuristics, describing
1) its day-to-day operations, 2) its periodic investment decisions,
and 3) at the highest level, its major strategic decisions, such as
whether and how to modify its day-to-day operations or which new
business opportunities to pursue.53

Although many investment and

strategic decisions are far from routine in the ordinary sense of
the word, the behavioral theory of the firm assumes they may
nonetheless

be

described

by

those

"...relatively

constant

dispositions and strategic heuristics..."54 that define what is
"...regular and predictable..."55 about them.
The use of the word "routines" to describe a firm's operations

Routines and Other Recurring Action Patterns of Organizations: Contemporary Research
Issues, 5 Ind. and Corp. Change 653 (1996).

For an update on recent developments, see

Special Issue: Theory of the Firm, Learning and Organization, 12 Ind. and Corp. Change
147 (2003).

As a survey of the literature will make clear, the treatment of routines

and heuristics here does scant justice to the subtleties and complexities of the
research issues.
53

Nelson & Winter, supra note 55, at 14.

54

Id. at 15.

55

Id.
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is not meant to suggest that they are simple or banal, either.
Rather, it reflects the view that many of the complex patterns of
activities that comprise a firm's operations are intentionally
repeated from one period to the next.

Indeed, a firm's success may

well depend on how effectively it is able to repeat complex
patterns of activities over time -- or, in other words, on how well
it is able to “routinize” its operations.56
routinization

of

a

firm's

operations

may

In this respect, the
describe

an

actual

management goal, and not just a theoretical conception of the
firm's behavior.
The use of routines and heuristics to conceptualize firm
behavior is not necessarily as pronounced a departure from the
conventional economic approach as it may appear.
heuristics

that

represented

as

problem.

define
the

a

firm's

solution

to

behavior
some

The routines and

might

constrained

be

usefully

optimization

Indeed, one might argue that the constrained optimization

techniques characteristic of the conventional economic approach are
themselves simply part of the routines of conventional economic
analysis.

On this view, they merely serve to help identify and

clarify the routines and heuristics that define a firm's behavior.
Indeed, this is the way in which many economists rationalize
their use of constrained optimization models.
56

Such models are

Nelson & Winter discuss routines as a target of the management goals of

control, replication and imitation.

See Id. at 112-124.
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simply too vulnerable to a reductio ad absurdum argument not to be
interpreted in some metaphorical sense.

Unless they are willing to

contend that the entire course of human history, down to its
minutest details, can be represented as some refinement of a
Bayesian-Nash

equilibrium

infinite-horizon,

path

overlapping

of

some

imperfect

generations

information,

model,

even

those

economists working strictly within the conventional paradigm will
acknowledge that the logic of optimization can be pushed only so
far.

Indeed, if constrained optimization techniques are used

heuristically,

they

may

rationality assumptions.57

be

fully

consistent

with

bounded

The important criterion is whether the

scope and complexity of the problem the agents in a model are
assumed to solve is within the range of their cognitive abilities.
There are three main reasons why this essay conceptualizes
firm behavior in terms of routines and heuristics rather than a
constrained optimization problem.

First of all, the analysis is

mainly directed at relational contracts between corporate entities.
A

corporation's
57

decision-making

capabilities

are

embodied

in

This does not mean that the bounded rationality assumptions are meaningless or

unnecessary.

It merely means to suggest that constrained optimization techniques may

be used heuristically to bring boundedly rational behavior into a sharper focus.
Attempts to interpret bounded rationality assumptions as merely calling for models in
which agents' behavior is characterized by optimizations subject to their cognitive
limitations (see Posner, supra note 31) are logically incoherent.

See Conlisk, supra

note 39 for a discussion of the infinite regress problem.
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distinct corporate assets -- eg) "human" and "organizational"
capital, computer programs, corporate records, etc.

It is more

realistic to conceive of a corporation’s capabilities and behavior
in terms of its routines and heuristics than in terms of a
constrained optimization problem.

Second, since the analysis is

predicated on bounded rationality assumptions, the nuances cannot
be

articulated

conventional

as

clearly

logic.

or

Finally,

completely
and

perhaps

in

terms

most

of

the

importantly,

conceptualizing firm behavior in terms of corporate routines and
heuristics

makes

the

bounded

rationality

assumptions

more

conspicuous and integral to the analysis.

The

Use

of

Routines

and

Heuristics

in

Modelling

Relational

Contracting Problems
For

the

purposes

of

this

essay,

relational

contracting

problems will be separated into two phases: 1) the first phase, in
which

each

of

the

parties

decides

whether

to

enter

into

a

relational contract and negotiates its terms and conditions, and 2)
the

second

phase,

in

which

the

parties

transact

within

the

parameters of a relational contract they have already entered into.
In the first phase of relational contracting problems, the parties
must compare the expected net gains from a relational contract with
the expected net gains that could be earned from any of the
alternatives, based, of course, on some understanding of how the
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relational contract and the alternatives would actually work.
The

parties'

interactions

within

the

second

phase

of

a

relational contracting problem will generally consist of a variety
of coordinated activities and cooperative adjustments, as required
by the circumstances at hand.

These coordinated activities and

cooperative adjustments will be conceptualized as the day-to-day
routines characteristic of the transaction.
meaning

of

the

term

"routine"

may

not

Although the ordinary
do

justice

to

the

difficulties of actually coordinating the parties' activities and
negotiating

cooperative

adjustments,

such

coordination

and

adjustment is nonetheless "routine" in the special sense used here.
In

the

event

of

some

unforeseen

contingency,

of

course,

the

routines governing the parties' conduct might fail, thereby causing
a fracture of the agreement.
The first phase of a relational contracting problem will be
conceptualized in two related ways.

The analysis will assume that

at the highest level in a firm's decision hierarchy, the level at
which the firm contemplates decisions with the broadest strategic
scope, the party's decision-making heuristics may be described
using Williamson's conjectures about the assignment of transactions
to governance structures.58

In Williamson's schema, a party first

forms some expectation about how well a governance structure would

58

Williamson, supra note 16.
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work, and then makes some assessment of how high the governance
costs would be.

The party will choose to enter into a relational

contract only if the governance costs would thus be lower than they
would be if any alternative means of organizing the transaction
were chosen (the next best alternative would usually be to organize
the

transaction

internally

within

the

firm’s

administrative

hierarchy).

III. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A firm's decision to enter into a relational contract is made
at the highest level in its decision hierarchy.59

Generally, a

profit-seeking firm will only enter into a relational contract if
it determines that 1) the transaction will yield sufficient net
returns, and 2) the governance costs of transacting through a
relational contract will be less than those that would be incurred
in sustaining the transaction by any other means.

The analysis

will assume throughout that a relational contract would yield
sufficient net returns to make the transaction at issue worthwhile.
Williamson

conjectures

that

the

costs

of

governing

a

transaction depend on four factors: 1) the size of any transactionspecific
59

investments,

2)

the

uncertainty

inherent

in

the

See Gordon Walker & David Weber, A Transaction Cost Approach to Make-or-Buy

Decisions, 29 Admin. Sc. Quar. 373, 381-383 (1984) for a discussion of the make-or-buy
decision making process of a large automobile manufacturer.
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transaction

environment,

3)

whether

the

transaction

will

be

repeated, and, most significantly, 4) the manner in which the
transaction is governed.60

For the purposes of this essay, a

relational contract may be considered one possible manner of
governing a transaction.

Internal organization within the firm’s

administrative hierarchy may be considered another.61

Williamson

reasons that the manner of governing a transaction with the lowest
costs will vary depending upon the other three factors.

He

suggests a schema for assigning transactions to the governance
structures with the lowest governance costs.
In Williamson's schema, a relational contract would only be
considered

for

a

transaction

that

1)

required

significant

transaction-specific investments, 2) had to be conducted in the
face of significant uncertainty, and 3) would be of an on-going,
long-term character.

The principal alternative to a relational

contract would be to organize the transaction internally, either
through a merger of the parties, a joint venture of some kind, or
by one of the parties investing in the capabilities necessary to do
itself whatever it was that would have been contracted for at arms
length.
60

61

For a transaction of an on-going, long-term character,

Williamson, supra note 16.

Williamson conceives of the manner in which transactions are governed more

broadly than in the narrow, legalistic sense assumed here.

The purpose of the

legalistic focus here is simply to highlight the analysis of legal doctrine.
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Williamson's

conjectures

about

the

choice

between

these

two

alternatives imply the following:
Uncertainty
moderate
large

high

Internal Organization/
Relational Contract

Internal Organization

Relational Contract

Internal Organization/
Relational Contract

Specific
Investments
moderate

The relative costs of governing a transaction through an armslength, relational contract rise as 1) the size of transactionspecific investments rises, and 2) the degree of uncertainty rises.
Thus, on-going transactions requiring large, transaction-specific
investments in highly uncertain environments will generally be
internalized.

On the other hand, on-going transactions that

require only small or moderate transaction-specific investments in
only moderately uncertain environments will generally be governed
through relational contracts.

On-going transactions requiring

large transaction-specific investments in moderately uncertain
environments

and

those

requiring

only

small

or

moderate

transaction-specific investments in highly uncertain environments
might best be governed through internal organization or relational
contracts, depending on the particulars of each case.
As simple as it may sound, Williamson's schema has been
elaborated and applied with great success in a number of empirical
34

studies.62

It has been extremely influential on the research

undertaken

by

formal

economic

theorists

as

well

scholars who study management and organizations.63

as

business

Indeed, it is

frequently taught, though perhaps in some distilled form, in a
number of MBA programs.

For all of these reasons, it is a useful

way of representing the heuristics that firms employ in deciding
how to organize their transactions.
Williamson's rationalization of his schema relies on the
assumption that economic agents are inevitably characterized by
both bounded rationality and opportunism.64
boundedly

rational,

the

parties

must

Because they are

leave

larger

gaps

in

a

relational contract as the environment becomes more uncertain.
This

places

agreement.

a

greater

onus

on

subsequent

adaptations

of the

The likelihood that one of the parties will behave

opportunistically, however, and refuse to cooperate in adapting the
agreement will also rise as the degree of uncertainty rises.

A

cloud thus hangs over the transaction, growing larger as the

62

See Howard A. Shelanski & Peter G. Klein, Empirical Research in Transaction

Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment, 11 J. Law & Econ. & Org. 335 (1995).
63

The influence of Williamson's transaction cost approach is particularly

evident in Alfred Chandler's monumental comparative history of the modern business
corporation.
64

See Alfred Chandler, Scale and Scope, (1990).

Williamson, supra note 16.
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environment becomes more uncertain.

At some point, one of the

parties will prefer to organize the transaction internally, so as
to eliminate the risk of disruptions and other inefficiencies
caused by the possibility of the other's opportunism.
While this logic is intuitively compelling, it has resisted
theoretical formalizations.
taken

up

problems,

Williamson's
but

they

Many formal economic theorists have

challenge

have

usually

to

investigate

proceeded

by

transactional
elaborating

on

information asymmetries or investment disincentives, rather than on
governance problems as Williamson has more broadly conceived of
them.65

The bounded rationality assumption has no doubt posed a

considerable impediment.

While a fully satisfying formal treatment

of governance problems is probably beyond the reach of existing
techniques, heuristic models may nonetheless prove insightful.
Some simple game-theoretic reasoning will be used, therefore, to
help conceptualize the link between uncertainty and the governance
costs of a relational contract.

This link is well worth clarifying

because it will prove central to the analysis of the role the
doctrine of impracticability may have in helping to reduce those

65

See, for instance, Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and

Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. Pol. Econ.
691 (1986); Oliver D. Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,
98 J. Pol. Econ. 1119 (1990); Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, The Theory of the Firm in
Handbook of Industrial Organization (1987).
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governance costs.

Some Game-Theoretic Heuristics
The discussion in this section is based on a simple, gametheoretic model that has been presented more formally elsewhere.66
The model describes a scenario in which two parties -- or “players”
-– must decide how much they will each invest for the sake of their
transaction and then how much they will cooperate with one another
during their subsequent and repeated interactions.
will

be

greater

the

larger

cooperative their interactions.

their

investments

Their profits
and

the

more

Unfortunately, they both know that

their transaction is prone to the prisoner’s dilemma: even if they
agree to cooperate fully, each knows that the other will have an
incentive to “cheat” by cooperating less than fully.

The cheater

prospers by sharing in the profits without pulling its weight while
the other -– the “dupe” –- suffers by having to pick up the slack.
The conventional wisdom holds that the players in a repeated
prisoner’s

dilemma

game

will

normally

be

able

to

sustain

a

cooperative agreement by threatening to punish any player who
66

See Donald J. Smythe, The Role of Contractual Enforcement and Excuse in the

Governance of Relational Agreements: An Economic Analysis, Global Jurist Frontiers:
Vol.2: No.2: Art.3 (http://www.bepress.com/gj/frontiers/vol2/iss2/art3).

For an

excellent, nontechnical introduction to game theory, its history and its methods, see
William Poundstone, Prisoner's Dilemma (1992).

For a technical introduction, see

Robert Gibbons, Game Theory for Applied Economists (1992).
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deviates.

In the model that is described here, the threatened

punishment would consist of the punishing party reverting to
completely noncooperative behavior in every remaining period of the
repeated game and thus causing the cheater to lose the benefits of
its cooperation.
indeed.

That would be a very severe threat of punishment,

But it would also be credible, since the party being

punished would have an incentive to behave noncooperatively in
every remaining period too, and the parties’ strategies would thus
be in a noncooperative equilibrium.67
A relational contracting agreement could be sustained in this
manner, however, only if the present discounted value of the losses
the parties anticipated from the threatened punishment were at
least as great as the short-term gains they could earn by cheating.
The short-term gains would derive from the cheater’s temporary
increase

in

profits

until

punishment commenced.

its

cheating

was

detected

and the

The anticipated losses from the punishment

would derive from the decrease in the future cooperativeness of the
parties’ interactions.

Since the gains from cheating are earned

immediately, but the losses are prospective, the difficulty in
sustaining

a

cooperative

agreement

through

punishment

threats

becomes greater as the rate at which the parties’ discount their
future profits (and losses) rises.
67

In game-theoretic terms, a cooperative equilibrium sustained by this

threatened punishment would be “subgame perfect.”

See Gibbons, supra note 71.
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If the parties were unboundedly rational then they would be
able

to

foresee

all

of

the

problematic

circumstances

and

contingencies that might arise over the course of their agreement
and agree on appropriate contractual safeguards.
parties

are

boundedly

rational

there

are

But since the

inevitably

some

contingencies that they cannot foresee and for which they cannot
plan.

Indeed, one of the great virtues of a relational contract is

that it does not require complete and exhaustive planning for every
possible

contingency.

Rather,

the

parties

can

adapt

their

agreement to contingencies as they arise.

In this sense, a

relational

parties

contract

helps

to

shelter

the

from

the

uncertainties of unforeseen contingencies.
There

is

another

sense,

however,

in

which

a

relational

contract actually exposes the parties to uncertainties they would
not otherwise face.

It is useful to distinguish between the

fundamental uncertainties inherent in the possible states of the
world and the strategic uncertainties inherent in a relational
contract.
parties'

The former derive mainly from factors external to the
transaction,

such

as

the

weather,

conditions, international conflicts, etc.
parties can do to avoid them.

macroeconomic

There is little the

The latter derive mainly from the

nature of the parties' transaction itself.

Once the parties enter

a relational contract each of their fortunes is tied in some
measure to the behavior of the other.

If they could always be
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relied upon to adapt their performances honestly and fairly in
accordance with the broader principles of their agreement, then the
fundamental

uncertainties

associated

with

the

unforeseeable

contingencies would not create any strategic uncertainties about
the behavior of the other.
As Williamson has emphasized,68 however, the parties may well
be expected to behave opportunistically.

For instance, in the

event of an unforeseen contingency one of them might refuse to
adapt the transaction, regardless of whether it had obliged itself
to do so at the outset.

Since the parties' failure to adapt their

agreement would be tantamount to a complete breakdown in their
cooperation, the possibility would add to the uncertainty they
faced going into the transaction.

Indeed, a significant part of

the uncertainty faced by the parties to a relational contract may
be of this strategic type.

And uncertainty of any kind causes the

parties to discount their future profits (and losses) more heavily,
thereby inhibiting the effectiveness of punishment threats in
maintaining a self-enforcing relational agreement.

Strategic Response
Since

a

relational

contract

is

by

design

largely

self-

enforcing, one important way in which the parties may respond to

68

Williamson, supra note 16.
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the uncertainties is by negotiating an agreement that is less than
fully cooperative.

Under the usual game-theoretic assumptions,69

the parties’ incentives to deviate from a cooperative agreement
decline as the cooperativeness of the agreement declines.

Thus, if

the uncertainty inherent in the transaction environment is too
great for the parties to be able to sustain a fully cooperative
agreement, they may still be able to sustain an agreement that is
less than fully cooperative.

Indeed, the implication is that they

might want to negotiate an agreement that is less than fully
cooperative to ensure that their agreement will be sustainable.
This is important because even a relatively small decrease in
the

cooperativeness

of

the

parties’

agreement

could

have

significant effect on the profitability of their transaction.

a
In

any one period a small decrease in the level of their cooperation
might not matter all that much, but a small decrease in their
cooperativeness in every period over the life of a long-term
agreement

probably

would.

Moreover,

the

decrease

in

the

cooperativeness of their transaction would usually be accompanied
by a decrease in the size of any initial investments they might
make towards the profitability of the agreement.

69

The overall

In particular, the assumption that the players’ payoff functions are

concave in the strategic variables.

Game-theoretic models are usually only well-

defined under concavity assumptions.
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effect could be very large.

An Example
The idea can be made more concrete with an example.70

Suppose

that a manufacturer would like to contract for the supply of
certain component parts.

Suppose, however, that the industry is in

flux so that any arms-length transaction will be fraught with
uncertainty.

The

manufacturer

would

like

to

enter

into

a

relational contract with a supplier so that they can adapt their
agreement to both foreseen and unforeseen contingencies as they
arise.

It finds a supplier and they begin their negotiations.

Both parties know that their relationship will be more profitable
if they can sustain high levels of cooperation.

The manufacturer,

for instance, may be operating under "just in time" principles.
Hence, it may have to depend on timely deliveries.

The supplier

may produce a number of different components for a number of
70

There is, of course, a catch.

The concept of a relational contract is

predicated on the notion that the parties are unable to specify all of their
contractual obligations in a written document.

Thus, many of the cooperative

adjustments that they expect to make under their agreement are not fully and clearly
defined in advance.

An example may help to clarify what these cooperative adjustments

might entail, but the more clearly it does so, the more it will seem that the parties
should have been able to specify them in a written instrument.

The example here

should thus be read more for the concreteness it lends to the problem than for any
insight it provides into the solution.
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different

manufacturers

using

flexible

production

facilities.

Hence, it may have to depend on receiving adequate advance notice
on any orders.
The parties would, of course, likely negotiate terms defining
time parameters for deliveries by the supplier and notice for
orders by the manufacturer.

The parties might anticipate, however,

that once the agreement was in effect they would both be willing to
negotiate around these parameters for the sake of maintaining a
good and prosperous business relationship.

Suppose, for instance,

that the manufacturer unexpectedly needed more parts on less
advance notice than the formal agreement required.
might still be willing to fill the order.

The supplier

It might have some

temporary excess capacity and hence not even have to incur any
additional costs.

Or it might be willing to run its facilities on

an overtime basis at some additional expense.

Suppose, on the

other hand, that the supplier was unable to make a timely delivery
without incurring inordinate costs.

The manufacturer might still

be willing to waive any applicable penalties.

It might have

sufficient quantities of the part in stock not to incur any
inconveniences or costs.

Or it might be willing to transfer

surplus parts from one plant to another.
Both the manufacturer and the supplier might stand to gain if
they had an understanding that they would each be willing to make
cooperative adjustments that were not specifically detailed in the
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contract.

But their understanding would have to recognize that

each would place certain limits on its willingness to make such
adjustments.

Just how far would the supplier be willing to go in

order to fill an order on short notice?
defer other jobs?
overtime?

Would it be willing to

Run four hours of overtime?

Eight hours of

Just how forgiving would the manufacturer be in the

event of a late delivery?

Would it be willing to run its stocks

down to precariously low levels?

Would it be willing to transfer

surplus parts from a plant two hundred miles away?

Two thousand

miles away?
As the example suggests, there might be considerably more
flexibility

inherent

in

the

possibilities

for

reciprocal

cooperation than a simple prisoner's dilemma game suggests.

In

general, it might be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
specify all of the details of the cooperative actions routinely
undertaken under a relational contract, and so many of them would
likely be left out of any written instrument.

The parties would

nonetheless enter a relational agreement with certain expectations
about just how cooperative they would each be.
suggests

that

uncertainties
surrounding

their
--

their

expectations

particularly
transaction.

the

might

well

strategic

The

The analysis above

parties

depend

on

uncertainties
might

the
--

reasonably

anticipate that both they and the other would routinely display
less cooperation in a more uncertain environment -- that is, one in
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which unforeseen contingencies were not only more likely, but also
more

likely

to

encourage

opportunism.

Indeed,

the

analysis

suggests that they would expect their transaction to be less
cooperative in a more uncertain environment because high levels of
reciprocal cooperation would be unsustainable.

Special Arbitration Procedures
An alternative -- or perhaps additional -- way in which the
parties might address the governance problems is by incorporating
special arbitration procedures into their agreement.

Scott, for

instance, suggests that the appointment of a contract referee who
is authorized to investigate and discover the facts surrounding a
dispute and then issue a final and binding judgment might be
particularly effective.71

Indeed, appointing an arbitrator with

such sweeping powers might help to 1) ensure that an agreement
would not be disrupted or terminated by unforeseen contingencies,
and 2) reduce the strategic uncertainties that might otherwise
inhibit the parties' cooperativeness during the life of their
agreement.

It would also, however, be quite costly -- though

perhaps not as costly as civil litigation.

The referee would have

to be paid some sort of retainer fee, regardless of whether
circumstances truly requiring her services ever arose.

71

And there

Scott, supra note 7, at 2049.
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would no doubt be additional adjudication costs if her services
ever were truly required.
Such arbitration procedures would essentially serve as a
substitute for judicial intervention.

Although they might allow

disputes to be adjudicated relatively cheaply compared to the civil
litigation process, they would not provide the same external
benefits.

There is a public good dimension to the judicial

resolution of contractual disputes, particularly if they are of a
recurring type.72
contracts,
drafting

and

any

Legal precedents provide default rules for all

may

thus

number

of

reduce

the

agreements.

costs
The

of

negotiating and

benefits

of

special

arbitration procedures, on the other hand, derive largely from
their capacity to reduce the strategic uncertainties surrounding a
particular relational contract.
to other transactions.

None of these benefits spill over

If a similar function could be served by a

contract default rule, such benefits would be available to all
contracting parties at much lower social costs.

The Governance Costs of a Relational Contract
The analysis illustrates some of the potentially important
governance problems associated with a relational contract.

It is

important to emphasize that these governance problems carry real

72

See Schwartz, supra note 14, at 277.
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economic costs.

Since special arbitration procedures of the type

just

imply

discussed

rather

direct

costs,

we

will

focus

on

governance costs which manifest themselves in the structure of
relational agreements.

For our purposes, therefore, we may think

of the governance costs of a relational contract as the difference
between the joint present discounted profits that would be earned
in a fully cooperative relational agreement and the joint present
discounted profits that would be earned in a sustainable but less
than fully relational agreement.73

Depending on the degree of

uncertainty inherent in the transaction environment, these could be
substantial.

Indeed, they might be substantial enough to make some

alternative to relational contracting desirable, even though a
relational contract is still feasible.
Indeed, the analysis implies there is a chain of linkages
between the uncertainty inherent in the transaction environment,
the

parties’

relational

discount

contract.

rates,
One

and

can

the

infer

governance
that

as

the

costs

of

degree

a
of

uncertainty and parties’ discount rates rise, the governance costs
of a relational contract will also rise.
alternatives

to

relational

contracting

This should make the
--

particularly

the

integration of the transaction within an administrative hierarchy 73

These are not true opportunity costs as they do not represent the costs of

alternatives foregone.

They are nonetheless helpful for thinking about transactional

problems.
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- relatively more attractive.

There is little, if any, reason to

believe that the costs of governing a transaction internally would
be as strongly affected by uncertainty in the environment as the
costs of governing a transaction at arms length.74

Thus, as the

degree of uncertainty rises, the relative costs of governing a
transaction

through

a

relational

contract

will

rise,

making

vertical integration relatively more attractive.
Most importantly, the analysis also suggests an important
linkage to the law of contracts.

It implies that any legal

doctrines that help to reduce the uncertainties surrounding a
transaction may also help to reduce the governance costs of a
relational contract.

Legal doctrines may thus have important

consequences for the manner in which transactions are organized
more generally.
through

a

A transaction will normally only be conducted

relational

contract

if

there

organization with lower governance costs.

is

no

other

mode

of

If legal doctrines help

to lower the governance costs of relational contracts, firms will
be less likely to organize transactions internally.

At the margin,

the volume of transactions conducted through relational contracts
will

be
74

greater,

and

the

volume

conducted

through

internal

To be more precise, there is no reason to believe the extent of cooperation

within a vertically integrated organization would decline in the same way that the
cooperativeness of a relational agreement would decline as the environment became more
uncertain.
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organization will be smaller.

The legal environment may thus have

subtle, though important and pervasive, consequences for the way in
which an economy is organized overall.
Indeed, the analysis suggests that the objective of reducing
governance
construction

costs
of

should
contract

be

an

laws.

important
It

implies

criterion
that

in

the

opportunism

increases the governance costs of relational contracts.

To the

extent that legal doctrines are poorly conceived and applied,
therefore, they will increase the likelihood of opportunistic
behavior and thus exacerbate governance problems.

To the extent

that legal doctrines are wisely conceived and applied, they will
decrease the likelihood of opportunistic behavior and thus help to
alleviate governance problems.

In this respect, contract law may

have a significant effect on the governance costs of relational
agreements in general even if it has only a marginal effect on
particular parties' propensities to behave opportunistically, since
the benefits will be felt across a multitude of transactions and
over a breadth of time.
Of course, sound normative conclusions will recognize that
legal doctrines may not only serve to impede opportunism, they may
also be used opportunistically themselves.

Thus, the possibilities

for opportunistic behavior should be evaluated in conjunction with
the legal doctrines that might be used to impede them.

And the

analysis should be conscious of the practical difficulties of
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interpreting and applying the rules.

Legal doctrines will only

succeed in diminishing the likelihood of opportunism and reducing
governance costs if they can be applied in a reasonably clear and
consistent

fashion

by

judges

and

juries

who

are

themselves

boundedly rational.

IV. THE DOCTRINE OF IMPRACTICABILITY AND THE GOVERNANCE COSTS OF A
RELATIONAL CONTRACT
The doctrine of impracticability will reduce the governance
costs of relational contracts only if it decreases the likelihood
of opportunistic behavior overall.
remember

that

impracticability

In this regard, it is well to
is

used

principally

as

an

affirmative defense to a complaint seeking specific performance or
damages for a breach or an anticipated breach of contract.

Its

purpose is thus to relieve one of the parties to a contract from
having to perform its contractual obligations.75

Whether it is used

to impede opportunism or to impede a legitimate complaint will
depend as much on the justification for the complaint as on the
75

A court could, of course, go beyond merely deciding whether to excuse

performances and actually arbitrate the parties' dispute.

Much of the commentary

concerning the excuse doctrines contemplates this more active form of judicial
intervention (see Gillette, supra note 7; Scott, supra note 7; Schwartz, supra note
14).

The analysis here construes the doctrine of impracticability more narrowly.

Thus,

it

contemplates

the

doctrine

only

as

a

means

of

excusing

contractual

performances.
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justification for the excuse.
The basic principles of a relational contract are antithetical
to legal intervention.

When they enter into a relational contract,

the parties commit themselves to resolving their own disputes by
adapting their agreement to unforeseen contingencies as they arise.
The need for litigation would itself suggest that one of them was
behaving opportunistically, or at least in violation of the basic
principles of party autonomy that otherwise defined the nature of
their agreement.76

There are two basic ways in which a party could

behave opportunistically: 1) by refusing to agree to an adaptation
in

circumstances

which

called

for

one,

or

2)

by

seeking

an

adaptation in circumstances which did not call for one.
Although the doctrine of impracticability might excuse a party
from performing its contractual obligations, in theory it need not
terminate the parties' relationship.

In principle, the other party

might still be able to induce the excused party's performance, but
only

by

renegotiating

agreement.

Thus,

--

if

or
a

adapting
court

--

the

applies

terms

the

of

their

doctrine

of

impracticability, it effectively forces the parties to negotiate an

76

The

parties

could,

of

interpretation of the contract.

course,

have

an

honest

disagreement

about

the

But it would be very difficult to distinguish an

honest disagreement about the interpretation of the contract from an opportunistic
interpretation of the contract.
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adaptation to their agreement instead of enforcing performances.77
Conversely, if a court declines to apply the doctrine, it enforces
performances

instead

of

forcing

adaptation to their agreement.

the

parties

to

negotiate

an

If a court applies the doctrine,

therefore, it may forestall the first type of opportunism at the
risk of aiding the second, and if it declines to apply the doctrine
it may forestall the second kind of opportunism at the risk of
aiding the first.
For easy reference, we will refer to a court's mistaken
application of the doctrine as a type I error.

We will refer to a

court's mistaken failure to apply the doctrine as a type II error.78
In an ideal world, of course, there would be no such thing as
opportunistic behavior and the probabilities of both types of
errors would be zero.

But in the world that we inhabit, the

parties to a contract might not only behave opportunistically, they
might also attempt to conceal it.

A party might attempt to conceal

its opportunism, for instance, by taking a bargaining position that
77

This assumes, of course, that they still could negotiate an adaptation of

their agreement.

In some cases, this might not be true; in others, the parties

might not be inclined to do so.

The assumption is made primarily to simplify and

facilitate the discussion.
78

cases.

This follows Goetz and McChesney's treatment of judicial errors in antitrust

See Charles J. Goetz & Fred S. McChesney, Antitrust Law: Interpretation And

Implementation 67-69 (1998).
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effectively precluded any kind of acceptable adaptation to an
agreement while at the same time denying that it was refusing to
adapt,

or

by

claiming

that

the

circumstances

called

for

a

particular adaptation when it knew they did not.
The availability of an impracticability defense, therefore,
would

not

overall.
would

necessarily

reduce

the

probability

of

opportunism

The change in the probability of opportunism overall

equal

the

probability

that

the

doctrine

would

prevent

opportunistic enforcements of contracts minus the probability that
it would be used opportunistically itself to force adaptations.

If

the probability that the doctrine would prevent opportunistic
enforcements was less than the probability that it would be used
opportunistically itself, then it would actually increase the
probability

of

opportunism

overall.

In

that

case,

the

impracticability doctrine might actually increase the governance
costs of a relational contract.

Of course, one would expect that

even boundedly rational parties would then attempt to nullify the
doctrine with an explicit waiver.79
79

The fact that parties rarely do

Some scholars may doubt whether the courts would respect the parties’

attempts to waive the impracticability doctrine.

Nonetheless, the language of

the U.C.C., the commentary of legal scholars, and the case law all suggest that
the doctrine of impracticability is waivable.

As Norman Prance, Commercial

Impracticability: A Textual and Economic Analysis of Section 2-615 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 19 Ind. L. Rev. 457, 483 (1986) notes, “A central axiom of
Article 2 is that the parties are free, within certain limits, to structure their
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attempt to waive the doctrine suggests that it probably does reduce
the probability of opportunism overall.
If

the

doctrine

of

impracticability

does

reduce

the

probability of opportunism overall, it probably also generally
reduces the governance costs associated with relational contracts.
The economies could take a number of forms: 1) an increase in the
expected longevity of relational agreements, 2) an increase in the
cooperativeness of relational agreements, 3) an increase in the

relationships as they see fit.”

Section 1-102(3) of the U.C.C. provides parties

wide discretion to vary the terms of sales contracts in general, except where the
U.C.C.

otherwise

prohibits,

and

except

where

obligations

diligence, reasonableness and care are concerned.

of

good

faith,

Section 2-615, which states

the doctrine of impracticability, is prefaced by the words, “Except in so far as
a seller may have assumed a greater obligation…,” and the exception is clarified
in comment 8 to mean that “The provisions of this section are made subject to
assumption of greater liability by agreement…”.

In general, courts have

interpreted this to mean that the parties to a sales contract may “enlarge upon
or supplant section 2-615” as they wish (see Eastern Airlines, INC. v. McDonnell

Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d. 957, 990 (1976) and Interpetrol Bermuda Ltd. V. Kaiser
Aluminum Intern., 719 F.2d. 992, 999 (1983).

There is only one case of which the

author is aware in which a court has ruled on a general waiver of section 2-615;
in that case, the court held that clauses expressly waiving section 2-615 were
“valid and enforceable in accordance with their terms.”

Wheelabrator Frackville

v. Morea Culm Services, Inc., No. 90-2962, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7192, at *81.
Of course, not all relational contracts would be governed by the U.C.C., but the
same arguments in favor of respecting the parties’ autonomy would still apply.
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size of the investments made under relational agreements, 4) a
decrease in expenditures on special arbitration procedures, and 5)
a decrease in the volume of transactions conducted under less
efficient

governance

structures,

particularly

those

involving

internal organization.
These economies would, of course, only come at the expense of
the additional legal costs associated with the availability of an
impracticability defense.

On one view, legal intervention is

merely

of

a

subsidized

form

arbitration.

As

the

foregoing

discussion noted, however, there is a public good dimension to many
kinds of legal intervention that often justifies the subsidy.

That

public good argument would appear to apply very well to the
doctrine of impracticability.

First of all, the doctrine of

impracticability is only one possible defense to a complaint
seeking contractual performance or damages.

There are other

defenses and the availability of the impracticability defense
therefore probably has only a marginal impact on litigation costs
overall.
reduces

Second, the doctrine of impracticability potentially
the

governance

costs

of

all

relational

contracts,

regardless of whether the parties ever need to use it.

Normative Implications
The analysis suggests that, subject to reasonable legal costs,
the

doctrine

of

impracticability

should

be

devised

so

as

to
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minimize the likelihood of opportunism.

To minimize the likelihood

of opportunism, the doctrine would have to maximize the difference
between the probability that it would forestall opportunistic
enforcement and the probability that it would be used opportunistic
itself.

The

probability

that

the

doctrine

would

forestall

opportunistic enforcement is inversely related to the probability
that it would not forestall opportunistic enforcement, which we
have defined as the probability of a type II error.

Thus, if the

doctrine was to be devised so as to minimize the likelihood of
opportunism overall, it would have to minimize the sum of the
probabilities of type I and type II errors.
The modern doctrine of impracticability has two requirements:
a foreseeability requirement and an impracticability requirement.
Consider the impracticability requirement first.

Assume that the

foreseeability requirement has been appropriately devised.

This

will allow us to focus all of our attention on the impracticability
requirement.
It is not difficult to imagine various ways in which the
impracticability requirement might be defined.

At one extreme,

impracticability could be defined so as to require that performance
be strictly impossible.

The doctrine of impracticability would

then be equivalent to the doctrine of impossibility as it evolved
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out of Taylor v. Caldwell.80
contract,

it

seems

very

In the context of a relational

likely

that

strict

impossibility

of

performance would constitute legitimate grounds on which a party
might seek adjustment.

Since impossibility could probably be

readily and accurately assessed, both the legal costs and the
probability of type II errors would likely be very small.
The probability of type I errors, however, would likely be
very high.

It is not difficult to imagine circumstances in which

performances would be physically possible but in which there might
still

be

legitimate

grounds

for

an

adjustment.

If

the

impracticability test required strict impossibility of performance,
therefore,

it

would

virtually

eliminate

type

II

errors,

and

probably economize on legal costs, but only at the expense of
causing a high probability of type I errors.
impracticability

would

rarely,

if

ever,

Thus, the doctrine of
be

exploited

for

opportunistic purposes, but it would also do little to forestall
opportunistic enforcements.
Consider an impracticability requirement at the other extreme:
suppose that impracticability merely required the availability of
some alternative superior to contractual performance (presumably
one that would yield higher present discounted profits).

If we

assume that this requirement would also be satisfied by any excuse

80

Taylor v. Caldwell, supra note 2.
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stronger than that (such as strict impossibility) then it is clear
that it would imply a very low probability of type I errors.

Legal

costs would also probably be low (it would be almost pointless to
argue that the party trying to evade performance did not have a
superior

alternative).

But

there

would

likely

be

many

circumstances in which parties would seek to evade contractual
performances opportunistically.
errors would be high.

Thus, the probability of type II

Under such an expansive interpretation of

the impracticability requirement, therefore, the doctrine would
rarely, if ever, allow opportunistic enforcement, but it would
probably be used opportunistically itself with great frequency.
Finally, consider an impracticability requirement similar to
that which is commonly employed -- one which requires "severe
hardship" or "catastrophic consequences."

Under the principles of

a relational contract, a party would probably be justified in
seeking adaptations which would ameliorate sufficiently severe
hardships.

Thus, the probability of type II errors would likely be

small -- certainly much smaller than under an impracticability
requirement as expansive as the one described above.

Depending on

how strictly the severe hardship requirement was interpreted,
however, there would likely be a significant probability of type I
errors.

Circumstances far short of severe hardship might well call

for adaptations.

Nonetheless, the probability of type I errors

would likely be much smaller than under an impracticability test

58

which required strict impossibility.
It seems reasonable to surmise, therefore, that some version
of a “severe hardship” impracticability requirement would probably
achieve the greatest reduction in opportunism overall.

It would

certainly avoid the high probability of type I errors that would be
observed under a narrow impracticability requirement and the high
probability of type II errors that would be observed under an
expansive impracticability requirement.
relatively

high

legal

costs,

It might, however, imply

particularly

if

the

courts'

interpretations of "severe hardship" or "catastrophic consequences"
were unclear or inconsistent.

From a normative perspective,

therefore, the best impracticability requirement would be one that
was of an intermediate scope and could be applied clearly and
consistently.
Now assume that the impracticability requirement has been
appropriately devised, and focus on alternative ways in which the
foreseeability requirement might be defined.
definition
nonexistent.

of

the

foreseeability

requirement

would

make

it

Thus, the doctrine of impracticability would have

only an impracticability requirement.
problematic.

The most expansive

This would almost surely be

It would virtually eliminate the probability of type

II errors, since excuses would be freely granted, but it would also
cause the probability of type I errors to be extremely high.

A

party's invocation of the impracticability doctrine in the face of
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circumstances that were easily foreseeable would almost always be
opportunistic.

A foreseeability requirement of some kind would

thus be necessary to provide the parties with at least minimal
incentives to foresee impracticability problems and avoid them if
at all possible.
Consider therefore a "subjective" foreseeability requirement - that is, one that simply required a party to show that the
problematic circumstances were unforeseen, regardless of whether
they were in any sense unforeseeable.

This would likely cause a

low probability of type II errors, but, because it would be
difficult for one party to show that the other did in fact foresee
a particular set of circumstances, it would also likely cause a
high probability of type I errors, and would likely result in high
legal

costs.

Indeed,

under

a

subjective

foreseeability

requirement, both parties would actually have an incentive not to
foresee problematic circumstances.

This might then place them in a

position to use the impracticability doctrine at some later date.
Such a use of the doctrine, however, would merely constitute a form
of planned opportunism.
Finally, consider an "objective" foreseeability requirement -that is, one that required a party to show that it did not foresee
the problematic circumstances, and that it was reasonable for the
party not to have foreseen them.

The difficulty of establishing

the reasonableness of a party's oversights would likely make the
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probability of type II errors greater than under a subjective test,
but not necessarily by a wide margin.

The probability of type I

errors, on the other hand, would likely be much lower.

There would

certainly be much less distortion of the parties' incentives to
foresee impracticability problems, if there was indeed any at all.
And if an objective test was applied in a reasonably clear and
consistent

fashion,

it

would

likely

result

in

fewer

impracticability cases going to trial and hence lower litigation
costs as well.
It also seems reasonable to surmise, therefore, that an
objective foreseeability test would help to achieve the greatest
reduction in opportunism overall.

Of course, an effective test

would have to be consistent with the cognitive limitations of the
judges and juries that applied it.

The simpler and clearer the

criteria upon which the foreseeability test was based, the greater
the likelihood that it would be clearly and consistently applied.

Routines, Heuristics, and the Foreseeability Test
The use of routines and heuristics to conceptualize the
parties' behavior suggests a simple and clear set of criteria upon
which to base an objective foreseeability test.

If the parties'

behavior may generally be described in terms of routines and
heuristics,

then

the

manner

in

which

they

generate

their
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expectations during the negotiation stage of an agreement may also
be

described

in

terms

of

routines

and

heuristics.

From

a

behavioral perspective, the parties to a dispute would only have
been able to foresee particular contingencies if their routines and
heuristics had allowed them to.
The reasonableness of a party’s oversights would be a factual
matter,

but

not

one

necessarily

requiring

any

detailed

investigation of the routines and heuristics that a party actually
employed.

Rather than investigating the source of a party's

oversights, the inquiry could focus on 1) determining what kinds of
routines

and

heuristics

would

have

been

reasonable

in

the

circumstances in which the contract was drafted -- eg) what kind of
personnel should have been assigned to negotiating and drafting the
agreement, what kind of legal advice should have been sought,
whether industry experts should have been consulted, and if so, of
what caliber and experience, etc., and 2) determining whether the
contingencies

would

likely

have

been

foreseen

if

reasonable

routines and heuristics had been employed -- eg) would sufficiently
experienced personnel have expected certain types of problems,
would an industry expert likely have warned the firm about certain
risks, etc.
This might seem to come very close to suggesting that standard
industry practices and customs should be used to establish the
reasonableness of the parties' oversights.

But that would only be
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true if the practices and customs were themselves reasonable.

At

any point in time, standard industry practices and customs might
lag well behind the "cutting edge" practices of industry leaders or
firms in other industries -- so far behind that a fact-finder could
consider them unreasonable.

Indeed, even if there was no lag, a

fact-finder might still consider them unreasonable merely in light
of common sense.

Although an objective test based on the parties'

routines and heuristics would undoubtedly place considerable weight
on evidence about standard industry practices and customs, it would
hardly make them dispositive.
Indeed, this use of routines and heuristics would not be
inconsistent

with

the

kind

of

cost-benefit

calculations

characteristic of the conventional law and economics approach.

If

a marginal expenditure of a few thousand dollars on some readily
available expert advice might have prevented catastrophic losses in
a multi-million dollar contract, one might reasonably conclude that
it should have been incurred.

Of course, a boundedly rational

party might only have had vague apprehensions about the risks of
such a catastrophe, and might thus have been unable to contemplate
the expected marginal benefits with any accuracy, but if the
discrepancy was sufficiently large, the party’s reasonableness
might still be brought into doubt.
In this sense, the courts could themselves use cost-benefit
calculations as a heuristic device.

Indeed, the use of cost-
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benefit calculations generally depends upon the user having the
ability

to

conceive

of

the

calculations might be applied.
to

conceptualize

the

manner

alternatives

against

which

the

The use of routines and heuristics
in

which

parties

generate

their

expectations would provide the courts with a very practical and
concrete way of conceiving of the parties' alternatives.

But this

would not preclude them from using other methods or heuristics to
reach their conclusions, either.

Modern Applications
This essay does not purport to present a positive theory about
the

doctrine

of

impracticability.

Indeed,

the

courts'

interpretations of the doctrine would seem to defy any kind of
coherent positive analysis.81

The essay's normative prescriptions

are nonetheless broadly consistent with the way the doctrine has
been applied in some important recent cases.

This is significant

because it implies that the normative prescriptions are at least
"feasible" in the sense that they could be followed without the
need for any radical departure from the precedents.

81

Schwartz, supra note 14, provides a very general positive analysis that

purports to identify necessary conditions for judicial intervention and show that they
are seldom satisfied in relational contexts.
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Eastern Airlines v. Gulf Oil Corp.82
This case originated in a complaint by Eastern seeking to
enforce Gulf's performance under a long-term contract in which Gulf
was obligated to supply Eastern with jet fuel.

Gulf responded to

Eastern's complaint by asserting, among other defenses, that the
contract was commercially impracticable under the U.C.C. section
2-615.
the

The case is especially relevant in view of the longevity of

parties'

relationship.

Indeed,

the

court's

opinion

acknowledged that the dispute arose only under "the most recent
contract

between

the

parties"

and

involved

"the

threatened

disruption of ...[their]... historic relationship,"83 which had
existed for several decades.
Gulf's impracticability defense was based on the argument that
it had not foreseen the "two-tier" pricing scheme that the Federal
Government imposed on the domestic market for crude oil subsequent
to the OPEC oil embargo in 1973-74, and that the price controls
caused such a wide divergence between the price that it had to pay
for crude oil and the price it received for its fuel under the
contract's escalator index that its performance became commercially
impracticable.

The court rejected Gulf's argument, however, both

on the grounds that it failed to show impracticability and on the
82

Eastern Airlines v. Gulf Oil Corp. 415 F.Supp. 429 (1975).

83

Id. at 431.
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grounds that the circumstances that gave rise to the dispute were
reasonably foreseeable.
The

court

interpreted

the

impracticability

requirement

strictly, noting that a "mere showing of unprofitability, without
more, will not excuse the performance of a contract."84

It also

appeared to apply an objective version of the foreseeability test,
noting that "even if Gulf had established great hardship ... [it]
would not prevail because the events associated with the so-called
energy crisis were reasonably foreseeable at the time the contract
was executed."85

Indeed, in support of this finding, the court

observed that "even those outside the oil industry were aware of
the

possibilities,"86

and

provided

an

illustrative

quote

from

Eastern's principal contract negotiator.

Iowa Elec. Light And Power Co. v. Atlas Corp.87
This case originated in a complaint by Iowa Electric (IE) in
part seeking Atlas's performance of its obligation to supply IE
with uranium concentrate under a contract executed in 1973.

Atlas

84

Id. at 438.

85

Id. at 441.

86

Id. at 442.

87

Iowa Elec. Light And Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F.Supp. 129 (1978),

overruled on jurisdictional grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (1979).
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responded

to

the

impracticability,

complaint
claiming

by

that

invoking
unforeseen

the

doctrine

contingencies

of
had

resulted in drastic cost increases which should have excused its
performance and warranted an adjustment of the contract price.

IE

claimed, however, that the instability in the uranium market was
one reason it had sought to insure that it would have access to
uranium supplies at the 1973 price.
Atlas based its impracticability defense on the argument that
a number of unforeseen circumstances, including the OPEC oil
embargo, federal environmental and occupational safety regulations,
inflated factor prices, and unfavorable market conditions, all
combined to dramatically increase its costs.

The court initially

rejected Atlas's defense on the grounds that it had "failed to bear
the burden...to prove which and how much of the increases were
reasonably unforeseen and not, in part, a function of its own
actions."88
record

by

The court subsequently allowed Atlas to clarify the
submitting

more

precise

declined to alter its judgment.

cost

calculations,

but

it

Using Atlas's new information, the

court attributed a 52.2 percent cost increase to circumstances that
Atlas had not foreseen and that had not been a function of its own
actions, and estimated Atlas's total loss at about $2,673,125.

It

ruled,

or

88

however,

that

Atlas

was

not

entitled

to

discharge

Id. at 132-133.
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adjustment as "the absolute losses and percentage of increase do
not warrant so drastic a remedy."89
The

court

justified

its

strict

interpretation

of

the

impracticability requirement by noting that the "mere fact that
performance has become economically onerous is not sufficient to
excuse performance," and that "increases of 50-58 percent generally
have not been recognized as a basis for excusing or adjusting
contractual obligations."90

Although the court's final decision did

not touch on the foreseeability requirement, its initial decision
had clearly relied on an objective version of the foreseeability
test.

Indeed, the court found that "prior to the contract being

signed

there

was

good

reason

to

anticipate

rising

costs

and

drastically increased expenditures for environmental and safety
equipment and procedures,"91 and it cited a November 14, 1972 Wall
Street Journal article which had forecast uranium price increases.

Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc.92
This case originated in a suit by Aluminum Co. (Alcoa) seeking

89

Id. at 140.

90

Id. at 140.

91

Id. at 135.

92

Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F.Supp. 53 (1980).
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an adjustment of its contract with Essex.
was

somewhat

unusual

and

prescriptions offered here.

outside

the

In this regard, the case
scope

of

the

normative

Alcoa's suit was obviously a preferred

alternative to simply refusing to perform and awaiting a suit by
Essex.

Under the contract Alcoa was obligated to convert alumina

supplied by Essex into aluminum, which was then to be conveyed back
to Essex.

The contract was executed in 1967 and was to run until

1983, with Essex having the option to extend it to 1988.

Alcoa's

justifications for the suit were based on a number of common law
excuse

doctrines,

including

the

doctrine

of

commercial

impracticability.
Alcoa's impracticability case was based on the argument that
unforeseen oil price increases in the wake of the OPEC oil embargo
and unanticipated pollution control cost increases caused its
production costs to rise more rapidly than the price it received
for its aluminum, which was indexed under the contract. Indeed,
during the period in question, the market price of aluminum rose
even faster than Alcoa's production costs, and Essex took advantage
of the discrepancy by reselling millions of pounds of aluminum for
an enormous profit.

Essex's gains were Alcoa's losses, and the

court found that without any adjustments to the contract Alcoa
stood to lose in excess of $75,000,000 (presumably in 1979 or 1980
dollars).

This prospective loss was the basis for Alcoa's claim

that its performance would have been impracticable.
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The

court

ruled

impracticability

that

both

requirements

the

had

foreseeability

been

met.

and

Although

the
it

acknowledged that Alcoa had developed the indexing system, it noted
that Alcoa had taken the care to examine the way the index
performed against the past record of aluminum prices and had found
that its performance fluctuated within a narrow range.

It also

noted that in constructing the index Alcoa had drawn on the
expertise of Alan Greenspan, who was then a leading economic
forecaster and is now, of course, the Chairman of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve.

And on a more general level, the

court noted that93
Essex

and

Alcoa

enterprises.

are

huge

industrial

The management of each is highly

trained and highly responsible.

The corporate

officers have access to and use professional
personnel

including

lawyers,

economists and engineers.
drafted

by

accountants,

The contract was

sophisticated,

responsible

businessmen who were intensely conscious of
the risks inherent in long-term contracts and
who plainly sought to limit the risks of their
undertaking.

93

Id. at 68.
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As far as the impracticability requirement was concerned, the
court noted that the standard had evolved from one of impossibility
of performance to one that "denotes an impediment to performance
lying between impossibility and impracticability"94 in the common
sense of the word.

It ruled that the increase in Alcoa's costs was

severe enough to warrant relief under such a standard.

The court

found that, even based on conservative predictions, Alcoa stood to
lose at least $60,000,000 over the life of the contract (again,
presumably in 1979 or 1980 dollars).

Although it did not discuss

Essex's ethical position in the dispute, the court did note that
"[the] margin of profit shows the tremendous advantage which Essex
enjoys under the contract" and that "[a] significant fraction of
Essex's advantage is directly attributable to the corresponding
...losses Alcoa suffers."95

This might be interpreted as an

insinuation that Essex was behaving opportunistically.

Some Final Observations
These cases are at least broadly consistent with the normative
prescriptions that have been offered in this essay.

One reason the

court rejected Gulf's impracticability defense in Eastern v. Gulf
was

that

the

oil

price

increases

which

Gulf

argued

were

unforeseeable had been foreseen even by outsiders to the industry.
94

Id. at 72.

95

Id. at 59.
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The clear implication is that Gulf's own contract negotiators
should have been able to foresee the risks.

In Iowa Electric v.

Atlas the court pointed to direct evidence that at least some of
And in Alcoa v.

Atlas's cost increases should have been foreseen.

Essex the court accepted Alcoa's impracticability argument on the
grounds that Alcoa had used sophisticated personnel and a highly
esteemed forecaster to construct the price index for its aluminum.
The court thus ruled that the failure of the price index was
reasonably unforeseen on the basis of the practices that Alcoa had
used in the process of negotiating and drafting the contract.
The courts also interpreted the impracticability requirement
strictly in all three cases, though not strictly enough as to all
but

deny

excuse

in

physically possible.

any

case

in

which

performance

was

still

Although the court's decision was not based

on the impracticability test in Eastern v. Gulf, the court did
indicate that impracticability required a showing of something more
than mere unprofitability.

And in Iowa Electric v. Atlas the court

denied Atlas relief on the grounds that cost increases of 50-58
percent and losses of $2,673,125 were not severe enough to meet the
impracticability

requirement.

Indeed,

the

impracticability

requirement was met only in Alcoa v. Essex -- and only there on the
basis of projected losses of at least $60,000,000.
Of the three cases, Alcoa has probably been the subject of the
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most commentary, and much of it has been critical.96

In Alcoa the

court chose to modify the contract instead of simply excusing
Alcoa's performance.

In so doing it went beyond the normative

prescriptions offered here.
use

of

the

The analysis here only justifies the

impracticability

doctrine

performance, not to modify a contract.

to

excuse

a

party's

The purpose of allowing the

courts to excuse performances is to forestall opportunism and at
the same time encourage the parties to adjust their performances
autonomously through bilateral negotiations.

On this reasoning, if

Essex had known that Alcoa's performance would be excused, the
parties probably would have been able to adapt their agreement
without any legal intervention.

Indeed, it is interesting to note

that Alcoa and Essex actually negotiated a modification of their
agreement contingent on Alcoa being excused before the court
reached its verdict.

The court's remedy only partially implemented

their proposed modification.
All of these cases involved contracts that could be construed
as "relational" in the sense defined here.

It is not clear,

however, that any of them involved particularly high governance
costs.

The analysis here implies that the governance costs of a

relational contract will be particularly high only in highly
96

Schwartz, supra note 14, at 293-94, for instance, describes the case as

"unsatisfactory" and claims the opinion has not been followed.

See also Scott, supra

note 7, at 2051; Sykes, supra note 10, at 83.
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uncertain environments.

It is not clear whether the environments

in which the transactions at the center of these cases were
conducted were sufficiently uncertain to cause particularly high
governance costs.

That is irrelevant, however, to the benefits

that might be derived from the appropriate application of the
impracticability doctrine.

The point of the analysis is not that

the appropriate application of the doctrine in any particular
contractual dispute will reduce the governance costs associated
with that contract.

Rather, it is that the appropriate application

of the doctrine in general will minimize the risks of opportunism
and reduce the strategic uncertainties associated with relational
contracts overall.

This will reduce the governance costs of all

relational contracts, especially those in which governance problems
are severe.

V. AN OVERVIEW OF SOME OF THE ETHICAL ISSUES
The law of contracts lies at the heart of capitalist economic
institutions.

It is thus intimately connected to the broader moral

values that both help to define and to sustain our entire social
and economic system.

But since it also regulates the conduct of

individual transactions, it is equally important to the moral
character of our day-to-day affairs.

Unfortunately, there is no

theoretical framework broad enough to encompass both the economic
and the ethical dimensions of contracting problems, even though
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they are interlocking pieces of the same puzzle.97
approached

relational

contracting

problems

from

This essay has
primarily

an

economic perspective, and it has suggested that the doctrine of
impracticability may serve a particular economic purpose.

It would

be instructive, therefore, to contemplate whether the normative
prescriptions might conflict with any of the moral values imbedded
97

This is in some ways ironic, because economics has deep roots in moral

philosophy.

Indeed, Adam Smith, who is usually considered the first professional

economist, was actually a professor of moral philosophy and may rightly be
considered as much of a philosopher as an economist.

See Patricia H. Werhane,

Adam Smith And His Legacy For Modern Capitalism (1991) for a study of Adam Smith
as a moral philosopher.

At some point, most professional economists became

predominantly interested in a social scientific approach to economic phenomena
and economics largely lost its connections to moral philosophy.
profession

has,

however,

recently

dimensions of economic problems.

shown

renewed

interest

in

The economics
the

ethical

Indeed, in a classic essay, Amartya Sen has

made a compelling argument that the rationality assumptions of the conventional
economic approach are inconsistent with the kind of moral choices that people
commonly make, and hence that some broader conception of human motivation, which
incorporates a role for moral deliberation, is essential to coherent theorizing
(see Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of

Economic

Theory,

in

Sen,

Choice,

Welfare

and

Measurement

84

(1982)).

Unfortunately, there is as yet no general theoretical framework which embodies
both peoples' economic and ethical motivations.

For a useful survey of

scholarship that explores the connections between ethics and economics, see
Daniel M. Hausman & Michael S. McPherson, Taking Rights Seriously: Economics and

Contemporary Moral Philosophy, 31 J. Econ. Lit. 671 (1993).
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in the contract laws.
It is only appropriate, however, to begin by making some
disclaimers.

The discussion here does not attempt to understand

relational contracting or the impracticability doctrine from the
perspectives of contemporary moral theories.

Its more limited

purpose is to address some of the practical moral and ethical
concerns that have been raised, or might be raised, by those who
have studied relational contracting problems and the doctrine of
impracticability.
Any analysis of ethical issues must surmount a number of
difficulties.

For one thing, it is very difficult to define

precisely what our moral values are, and to distinguish them from
the moral values held by people in other societies and cultures.98
Indeed, it is not even clear whether our moral values are always
consistent.99
98

In a given set of circumstances, for instance, the

One survey study of American and Soviet attitudes towards free markets, for

instance, found that American and Soviet respondents were "basically similar in some
very important dimensions: in their attitudes toward fairness, income inequality, and
incentives and in their understanding of the working of markets."

Robert J. Shiller,

et al., Popular Attitudes Toward Free Markets: The Soviet Union and the United States

Compared, 81 Amer. Econ. Rev. 385, 385 (1991).
99

This creates the potential for moral dilemmas.

See Joanne B. Ciulla, Business

Ethics as Moral Imagination, in R. Edward Freeman, ed., Business Ethics: The State Of
The Art (1991).

Ciulla argues that moral dilemmas may be addressed only by

cultivating the moral imagination.

Regardless of whether this is true, they will
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value that we place on the principle of desert might well clash
with the value that we place on distributional equity.

Moreover,

ethical issues are highly emotive, and our ethical assessments of
certain outcomes may be based as much on inarticulable feelings as
on conscious deliberations.100

Finally, our ethical judgments may

be "situational" -- that is, they may be deeply rooted in the
circumstances of individual cases and thus resist generalization.101
All of these difficulties, and no doubt others as well, impede
our capacities for moral analysis.

But the last is particularly

germane to relational contracting problems.

Relational contracting

is a relatively recent development in the evolution of contract
law.

The moral and ethical values that sustain the classical

contracting paradigm may provide an inappropriate basis for an
ethical

assessment

of

relational contracts.

the

role

that

legal

doctrines

play

in

It is especially important, therefore, to

clearly not be easily susceptible to analytic treatments.
100

Robert Solomon, for instance, argues that emotions have a natural and central

place in all moral judgments.

See Robert C. Solomon, A Passion For Justice: Emotions

and the Origins of the Social Contract (1990).
101

See Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality (1966) for the

classic argument.

See Kenneth E. Goodpaster, Ethical Imperatives and Corporate

Leadership in R. Edward Freeman, Business Ethics: The State of The Art (1991) for an
argument that a corporation's managers must understand the specific circumstances in
which its employees must act if it is to improve upon its ethical standards.
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approach

relational

contracting

problems

character and circumstances clearly in mind.

with

their

unique

These may not only

require fresh ethical perspectives on established legal doctrines,
they may also require that we reconsider some of the broader moral
values that lie at the very heart of contract law.
The conceptualization of relational contracting problems in
this essay has implied a set of circumstances with distinctive
ethical

overtones.

The

parties'

inclinations

to

behave

opportunistically reflect ethical shortcomings that may impede
their abilities to cooperate, in spite of the potential mutual
gains.

The role that has been prescribed for the doctrine of

impracticability is to forestall such opportunism and thus help to
alleviate the costs that would otherwise result from these ethical
shortcomings.

Some of the ethical implications of the analysis are

thus deeply imbedded in the conceptualization of the circumstances.
Indeed,

in

that

respect

the

analysis

suggests

that

the

impracticability doctrine may serve as a substitute for good
business ethics.

On the other hand, it also suggests that good

business ethics might yield significant economic benefits.

Contract as a Form of Individual Expression
Classical contract analysis and neoclassical economics both
reflect the great value that has traditionally been placed on the
principles of economic liberty and voluntary exchange.

They are

intimately connected to the notion that the freedom to contract is
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an

inviolable

disapprobation

form
for

of

self-expression

those

who

seek

and

to

be

the

common

excused

moral

from

performance of obligations that were voluntarily incurred.

the

Under a

theory of contract as a "mechanism for autonomous individual
expression,"102 a "contract's moral force derives from the fact of
its voluntary agreement; when I enter freely into an agreement, I
am bound by its terms, whatever they may be."103
conception
towards

of

the

contracts

idea

of

is

therefore

contractual

The classical

inherently

excuse.

antagonistic

Indeed,

those

who

subscribe to the classical model tend to view relational contracts
as a subspecies of contracts somewhere within the "more nebulous
realm of fiduciary relations."104
That may, indeed, be true, but it is not at all clear that
relational contracting practices will undermine the principles of
economic

liberty

and

voluntary

exchange,

or

that

they

are

inconsistent with the notion of contract as a form of individual
expression, even if, as has been proposed here, they allow for the
possibility of contractual excuse.

The decision to enter into a

relational contract is made freely and voluntarily, and there is no
102

103

Gillette, supra note 7, at 571.

M. Sandel, Liberalism And The Limits Of Justice 105-113 (1982) quoted in

Gillette, supra note 7, at 571.
104

Gillette, supra note 7, at 571.
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reason why that decision cannot itself be interpreted as a form of
individual expression.

On that view, the parties to a relational

contract commit themselves to an agreement in which they may have
both a right and an obligation to adapt their performances in the
face of new circumstances.

Once they have voluntarily made such an

agreement, they should be bound by its terms, including those
requiring adaptations, no less than they would be in a classical
contract.

The doctrine of impracticability would simply force them

to honor their commitments in circumstances that might otherwise
induce them to behave opportunistically.
From this perspective, relational contracts serve to expand
the range of economic liberties and the freedom to engage in
voluntary exchange.

It hardly matters whether they more closely

resemble fiduciary relationships or classical contracts.

The

important point is that they probably allow for a wider variety of
individual expressions than partnerships and classical contracts
would in their absence.

Moreover, the parties' commitments are no

less binding than those made under other contract forms; they are
simply somewhat different.

And though it might appear that the

doctrine of impracticability would allow the courts to intervene in
an otherwise autonomous relationship, it should be remembered that
the doctrine is basically a defense to a complaint seeking specific
performance.

When a court applies the doctrine, therefore, at

least as it has been prescribed here, and declines to enforce
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performances, it forces the parties to resolve their dispute
themselves, and thus interferes with their autonomy no more than it
would have if it had enforced their performances.
Indeed, the doctrine of impracticability is merely a default
rule.

It is not immutable, like the duty to act in good faith, and

so there is no reason why parties could not simply nullify it with
an explicit contractual waiver.
without

waiving

it,

When parties enter into a contract

therefore,

they

intentions to be bound by its terms.105

implicitly

express

their

This is especially true of

the kind of relational contracts that have been discussed here.
These are generally executed by large corporate entities that are
managed by sophisticated and experienced business personnel and
have direct access to considerable legal and economic expertise.
Although there are no doubt limits on their rationality, they must
105

See Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual

Consent, 78 Va. L. Rev. 821, 864-5 (1982) for an articulation of a consent theory
in which the parties manifest an intention to be legally bound by contract
default rules simply by invoking the system of legal enforcement.

The consent

theory is fully consistent with the conventional law and economics view, and has
been used in a number of important law and economics studies – see Ian Ayres and
Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of

Default Rules, 98 Yale L.J. 87 (1989); Jason Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and
the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 Yale L. J. 615 (1990); Ian
Ayres and Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal

Choice of Legal Rules, 101 Yale L.J. 729 (1992).
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understand the legal consequences of executing a contract without
waiving the doctrine of impracticability, and they must also
understand in principle how easily such a rule could be waived.
The

fact

that

they

do

not

attempt

to

waive

it

can

only

be

interpreted as an expression of their intentions.

The Internal Norms and Ethics of a Relational Contract
A relational contract tends to generate its own internal norms
and ethics.106
According

Indeed, these may well be essential to its success.

to

Scott,

interpersonal

ethics

for

instance,

that

the

develop

norms

between

of

the

behavior

and

employees

of

transacting corporations can "help to solidify the relationship and
permit it to survive the myopia of individual decisionmakers."107
These may thus serve as an alternative means of reducing the
strategic
agreement.
substitutes
therefore,

uncertainties

otherwise

inherent

in

a

relational

Indeed, Scott conceives of excuse doctrines largely as
for

extralegal

consider

the

means

of

possibility

control.108
that

active

We
use

should,
of

the

impracticability doctrine would simply impede the development of
the internal norms and ethics that might otherwise serve a similar
106

See the discussion in Scott, supra note 7, at 2040-2042.

107

Id. at 2042.

108

Id. at 2051.
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function, but perhaps serve it better.
On this matter, however, our analysis must remain speculative.
The theoretical framework of this essay assumes that the doctrine
of

impracticability

opportunism.

may

have

a

useful

role

in

forestalling

Thus it implicitly assumes that any adverse effects

the doctrine would have on the internal norms and ethics of a
relational contract would be more than offset by its own benefits.
A truly rigorous assessment of the issue could only be undertaken
in a framework that was flexible enough to incorporate the internal
norms and ethics explicitly into its analysis.

As the foregoing

discussion indicates, there is as yet no such framework.

There

are, however, good reasons to doubt whether the "interplay between
legal and extralegal methods”109 of control argues against the
normative prescriptions for the doctrine of impracticability that
have been suggested here.
For

one

thing,

the

vast

majority

of

laws

are

probably

complements rather than substitutes to the moral and ethical values
that also serve to inhibit dysfunctional behavior.
laws,

for

instance,

almost

certainly

Most criminal

complement

the

moral

proscriptions that inhibit most people from engaging in criminal
acts.

One never hears politicians proclaiming that they will

repeal the criminal laws to reduce the crime rate.

Of course,

contract laws address very different kinds of behavior and may
109

Id.
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therefore

interact

with

completely different way.

our

moral

and

ethical

values

in

a

But other contract doctrines, such as

the duty to act in good faith, seem to embrace ethical principles,
and we do not worry whether they will in any way diminish the
ethical standards that also might help to encourage desirable
behavior.

There is little reason to believe that the doctrine of

impracticability is not also a complement rather than a substitute
for the internal norms and ethics that otherwise serve to forestall
opportunism under a relational contract.
Moreover,

it

bears

repeating

that

impracticability is only a default rule.

the

doctrine

of

On this view, if the

parties felt that it would impede the internal norms and ethics of
their relationship, they could simply contract around it.

The

doctrine would then generally only apply when any adverse effects
it was expected to have on the relationship would be more than
offset by its expected benefits.

If the parties could be relied

upon to make such assessments wisely, then the availability of the
doctrine as a default rule would still minimize the incidence of
opportunism overall.

Of course, since the parties are boundedly

rational they might not always make those assessments wisely, and
so the doctrine might apply to some contracts in which it was
detrimental.

But

one

would

expect

that

the

accumulation

of

commercial experience and wisdom would probably soon lead to the
doctrine being waived as a matter of standard business practice.
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Excuse and Fairness
From an ethical perspective, the "fairness" of the outcome
should be an important goal in the adjudication of any contractual
dispute.
doctrine

It is important to consider, therefore, whether the
of

impracticability

is

consistent

with

the

delicate

balance between the principles of distributional equity and desert
that seems to comprise our notion of "fairness."
scholars

would

agree

that

it

is,

even

if

Not all legal

they

accept

the

proposition that the parties to a contract are boundedly rational.
As Gillette puts it,110
The bounded rationality model assumes actors
engage in a rational decision-making process
that satisfies their concerns for subsequent
intervening events, despite their inability to
make

precise

probabilistic

calculations.

Thus, an actor who has rationally determined
to exclude a specific risk, or not to consider
further

the

possibility

of

an

intervening

event, is not simply an innocent victim of
circumstances....An actor that has reasoned
that additional investments in discovery and
consideration

of

risks

are

not

worth

the

110

Gillette, supra note 7, at 581.
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effort seems to deserve the consequences of
that decision.
According

to

Gillette,

therefore,

the

party

that

is

"disadvantaged" by some unforeseen contingency deserves the loss.111
But it is not clear that Gillette's argument applies to parties who
form relational contracts as they have been conceived here.

As

they have been conceived here, relational contracts provide a means
of coping with unforeseen contingencies as they arise, rather than
attempting to plan for them in advance.

Thus, when parties form a

relational contract they do so with the understanding that their
agreement

will

be

adapted

to

new

circumstances

and

unique

situations as they unfold.

This is corroborated by the fact that

they

contract

rarely,

if

impracticability.

ever,

around

the

doctrine

of

It seems clear, therefore, that they do not

intend the consequences of their decisions to be to have to
passively accept their losses in the event of some catastrophic
unforeseen contingency.
should

force

them

to

There is thus no reason why the courts
accept

such

losses

by

enforcing

their

performances.
This essay has presented an analytical framework in which the
doctrine

of

impracticability

derives

its

usefulness

from

its

capacity to reduce the governance costs of relational contracts by
reducing

the

strategic

uncertainties

associated

with

parties'

111

Id. at 582.
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propensities to behave opportunistically.

The term "opportunism"

obviously has connotations of unethical behavior.
sense

in

which

the

gains

that

opportunistically are deserved.

a

party

earns

There is no
from

behaving

In fact, we would normally think

such opportunism inconsistent with the principles of honesty and
fair dealing that provide the bedrock for good business ethics.

To

the

to

extent

that

the

doctrine

of

impracticability

serves

forestall opportunism, therefore, it might also help to raise the
ethical standards of parties' business dealings.

Indeed, since

good business ethics may well be good for business in general,112
the doctrine might yield economic benefits beyond those suggested
by the analytical framework alone.

VI. CONCLUSIONS
This essay has analyzed the doctrine of impracticability from
a behavioral economics perspective.
the

doctrine

contracts

may

by

reduce

curbing

opportunistically.
doctrine

should

the

It has attempted to show that

governance

parties'

costs

of

propensities

relational
to

behave

To that end, the analysis suggests that the

employ

a

severe

hardship

criterion

for

impracticability test and an objective foreseeability test.
112

This is certainly the view of most business ethicists.

the

To the

See, for instance,

Robert Solomon, Ethics and Excellence: Cooperation and Integrity in Business
(1992).
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extent the doctrine does reduce the likelihood of opportunism
overall, it will 1) increase the longevity of relational contracts,
2) improve the cooperativeness of relational contracts, 3) increase
the size of investments under relational contracts, 4) decrease
expenditures on special arbitration procedures, and 5) decrease the
volume

of

the

transactions

conducted

under

less

efficient

governance structures, in particular, administrative hierarchies.
All of these would yield direct economic benefits.

There might be

other benefits as well, though these are beyond the scope of the
analysis.
The normative prescriptions are meant to be tentative and
provocative.

Further research on relational contracting practices

and the legal doctrines that apply to them will undoubtedly prove
of great value.

This essay does not present any empirical evidence

in support of its analytic results.

That does not, however, mean

that it is completely without any empirical basis.

The analysis is

vested in a theoretical framework that has been applied with great
success in a number of empirical studies and has been employed to
clarify and communicate important transitions in the history of the
modern business corporation.113
with

a

large

and

Thus, the analytic results cohere

systematic

body

of

empirical

evidence.

Nonetheless, further empirical research may prove particularly
valuable.

Empirical

studies

that

attempt

to

probe

the

113

See Shelanski & Klein, supra note 62; Chandler, supra note 63.

88

interconnections between legal doctrines and the microanalytics of
individual transactions may prove especially insightful.

This

suggests a challenging research agenda, but one that promises great
rewards.
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